Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis: Rethinking Buddhism Materialism by Shields, James
Bucknell University 
Bucknell Digital Commons 
Faculty Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
Fall 9-1-2013 
Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis: Rethinking Buddhism 
Materialism 
James Shields 
Bucknell University, jms089@bucknell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/fac_journ 
 Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, History of 
Religions of Eastern Origins Commons, Other Languages, Societies, and Cultures Commons, Other 
Philosophy Commons, Other Religion Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of 
Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shields, James. "Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis: Rethinking Buddhism Materialism." Journal of 
Buddhist Ethics, Special 20th Anniversary Issue (2013) : 461-499. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Bucknell Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Bucknell Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact dcadmin@bucknell.edu. 
Special 20th Anniversary Issue 
 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
ISSN 1076-9005 
http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/ 
Volume 20, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis: 
Rethinking Buddhist Materialism 
 
 
James Mark Shields 
Bucknell University 
 
 
 
Copyright Notice: Digital copies of this work may be made 
and distributed provided no change is made and no altera-
tion is made to the content. Reproduction in any other 
format, with the exception of a single copy for private 
study, requires the written permission of the author. All 
enquiries to: cozort@dickinson.edu. 

  
 
 
 
Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis: 
Rethinking Buddhist Materialism 
 
James Mark Shields1 
 
 
Abstract 
Although it is only in recent decades that scholars have be-
gun to reconsider and problematize Buddhist conceptions 
of “freedom” and “agency,” the thought traditions of Asian 
Buddhism have for many centuries struggled with ques-
tions related to the issue of “liberation”—along with its 
fundamental ontological, epistemological and ethical im-
plications. With the development of Marxist thought in the 
mid to late nineteenth century, a new paradigm for think-
ing about freedom in relation to history, identity and social 
change found its way to Asia, and confronted traditional re-
ligious interpretations of freedom as well as competing 
Western ones. In the past century, several attempts have 
been made—in India, southeast Asia, China and Japan—to 
bring together Marxist and Buddhist worldviews, with only 
moderate success (both at the level of theory and practice). 
                                                        
1 Associate Professor of Comparative Humanities & Asian Thought, Bucknell University. 
Email: james.shields@bucknell.edu.  
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This paper analyzes both the possibilities and problems of a 
“Buddhist materialism” constructed along Marxian lines, 
by focusing in particular on Buddhist and Marxist concep-
tions of “liberation.” By utilizing the theoretical work of 
“radical Buddhist” Seno’o Girō, I argue that the root of the 
tension lies with conceptions of selfhood and agency—but 
that, contrary to expectations, a strong case can be made 
for convergence between Buddhist and Marxian perspec-
tives on these issues, as both traditions ultimately seek a 
resolution of existential determination in response to alienation. 
Along the way, I discuss the work of Marx, Engels, Gramsci, 
Lukàcs, Sartre, and Richard Rorty in relation to aspects of 
traditional (particularly East Asian Mahāyāna) Buddhist 
thought. 
 
Introduction 
A person of wisdom is not one who practices Buddhism 
apart from worldly affairs but, rather, one who thoroughly 
understands the principles by which the world is governed. 
The true path lies in the affairs of this world. The Golden 
Light Sutra states, “To have a profound knowledge of this 
world is itself Buddhism.” The Nirvana Sutra states, “All the 
non-Buddhist scriptures and writings are themselves Bud-
dhist teachings, not non-Buddhist teachings.” When the 
Great Teacher compared these passages with the one from 
the sixth volume of the Lotus Sutra that reads, “No worldly 
affair of life or work are ever contrary to the true reality,” 
he revealed their meaning and pointed out that although 
the first two sutras are profound, because their meaning is 
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still shallow and fails to approach that of the Lotus Sutra, 
they relate secular matters in terms of Buddhism, whereas 
the Lotus Sutra explains that in the end secular matters are 
the entirety of Buddhism. The essence of the sutras 
preached before the Lotus Sutra is that all phenomena arise 
from the mind. To illustrate, they say the mind is like the 
great earth, while the grasses and trees are like all phe-
nomena. But it is not so with the Lotus Sutra. It teaches that 
the mind is itself the great earth, and that the great earth 
itself is the grasses and trees. The meaning of the earlier 
sutras is that clarity of mind is like the moon, and that pu-
rity of mind is like a flower. But it is not so with the Lotus 
Sutra. It is the teaching that the moon itself is mind, and the 
flower itself is mind. You should realize from this that pol-
ished rice is not polished rice; it is life itself. 
Nichiren, Hakumai ippyō gosho (“The Gift of Rice”) 
 
Contrary to the propaganda, we live in probably the least 
materialistic culture in history. If we cared about the things 
of the world, we would treat them quite differently—we 
would be concerned with their materiality. We would be in-
terested in their beginnings and their ends, before and af-
ter they left our grasp. As it is, what we are really con-
sumed by are the dreams and myths temporarily attached 
to the objects around us; and when these dreams and 
myths wear off, the object to which they were attached is 
pitched into the waste bin. The consumer heads off again 
on the trail of the beckoning image of delight. 
Peter Timmerman, “Defending Materialism” 
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The materialistic conception of history is not to be com-
pared to a cab that one can enter or alight from at will, for 
once they enter it, even the revolutionaries themselves are 
not free to leave it. 
Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” 
 
As Critical Buddhists Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō highlight-
ed several decades ago, the interdependence between Buddhist institu-
tions and various despotic Asian kingdoms and states from ancient times 
until the modern period is—however problematic to modern and con-
temporary progressive Buddhists—undeniable.2 This, of course, is also 
true for Christianity in the Western world—at least since the time of 
Constantine—as well as most other major religious traditions. Athough 
the historical link between philosophy and the state may appear less ob-
vious, for theorists Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Félix Guattari (1930-
1992), Western philosophy as well, by way of its “bureaucratization” of 
consciousness, has never been able to abandon its origins in the codifica-
tions of the despotic imperial state. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari follow 
Marx in asserting the necessity of establishing a new form of thought—a 
new task for philosophy—one that controverts the traditional philoso-
phy without, somehow, allowing itself to be “codified.”3 The way to do 
                                                        
2 See my Critical Buddhism: Engaging with Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought (Ashgate, 
2011) for a contextual analysis and critique of the Critical Buddhist movement. The pre-
sent essay is an attempt to extend some of the insights of Critical Buddhism by picking 
up a topic they virtually ignore: materialism. I would like to assert at the outset that I 
am not making any assertions here about real or true Buddhism, but rather suggesting 
alternative ways to re-envision Buddhism along materialist lines. 
3 See Kołakowski 66-67 on Marxism as “a new philosophical possibility and a new escha-
tology” based on a “conception of humanity self-present as an Absolute in its own 
465 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
 
 
 
this, argue Deleuze and Guattari, is to reject the “drama of interiority” 
that Western thought has made foundational, replacing that with “the 
creation of concepts that can register and delineate the transmission of 
forces to bodies” (Surin 160). 
Here, Kenneth Surin suggests, the precursors of Deleuze and 
Guattari are less Marx and Engels than Spinoza and Nietzsche. And yet, 
to some extent this entire approach towards a new “physics of thought” 
is rooted in the fundamental materialist insight underlying Marx’s theo-
ry of ideology: that is, every idea or concept is itself conditioned by various 
material forces (see Mannheim 244). As Surin summarizes: “the new phi-
losophy that will experiment with the real, will eschew such abstractions 
as universals, unities, subjects, objects, multiples, and put in their place 
the processes that culminate in the production of the abstractions them-
selves” (161). It will be, in short, a “universal acid” liquidating all philo-
sophical presuppositions—including those of conventional, “hylomor-
phic” materialism (Deleuze and Guattari 45). As a result, as with the neo-
pragmatist thought of Richard Rorty (1931-2007), philosophy is not so 
much a form of reflection as a sort of constructionism instituted on “the 
plane of immanence” (35-37). Also like Rorty—and, I suggest, the “Dhar-
mic materialism” of radical Buddhists such as Seno’o Girō (1889-1962) 
and B. R. Ambedkar (1891-1956)—Deleuze argues for a “limit” to the ma-
terialist conception of the world. Philosophy cannot rest on a reductive 
physicalism, one that simply “insists on the substantiality of Being.” Ra-
ther, physicalism must be paired with noology, which insists on the prima-
cy of “the image of thought” (Deleuze and Guattari 44). 
                                                                                                                                          
finitude,” as well as a concomitant “rejection of all solutions that involve man realizing 
himself by the actualization, or at the command, of an antecedent absolute Being.”  
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For Deleuze, the image of thought is a kind of pre-philosophy, 
which operates on the plane of immanence, and constitutes a pre-
philosophical presupposition that philosophy has to satisfy. And yet: 
The image of thought, even it is an immaterialism, is not 
antithetical to a strict materialism. The plane of imma-
nence reveals the “unthought” in thought, and its absolute 
incompatibility with materialism only comes about when 
philosophers forget that thought and the constitution of 
matter have the fundamental ontological character of 
events, and instead identify “matter” with Body, and 
“thought” with Mind, in this way saddling themselves with 
an impasse that cannot be resolved because Mind and Body 
are said to possess mutually incompatible properties (“in-
ert” vs. “active,” “material” vs. “spiritual,” and so forth). 
The ontology of events, by contrast, allows the material 
and immaterial to be interrelated and integrated in a cease-
less dynamism. (Surin 161; see Deleuze and Guattari 44-49) 
What is it, then, that links concepts to matter? The answer, for Deleuze, 
as for Rorty, is function. It is through function that “concepts are re-
turned to material things… and things are integrated with concepts.” In 
short, a radical immanence withstands the introduction of concepts via 
the process or event of function. And although it would seem that philo-
sophical materialism should go hand-in-hand with a commitment to 
immanence, in fact this is often not the case, as matter itself takes on a 
transcendent guise as the ultimate locus of meaning and value.4 For 
                                                        
4 Unlike Marxist doctrine, which has it origins in the 1840s, philosophical materialism—
the basic insight that all things are composed of matter and all phenomena the result of 
material interactions—is an idea with deep and wide-ranging historical roots. However, 
it seems that philosophical materialism first made its appearance in ancient India with 
the Lokāyata or Cārvāka school, several centuries prior to the theories of Democritus, 
Epicurus and Mozi. The Cārvākas are generally considered, along with Buddhists and 
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Deleuze, “the materialism of philosophy is compromised only when the 
immaterial is harnessed to the transcendent: without resort to the trans-
cendent, immaterialism and materialism can be kept on the same 
plane—immanence—and made to interact productively” (Surin 161). 
A related critique of the “excesses” of philosophical materialism, 
particularly as expressed within orthodox Marxism, can be found in the 
work of two prominent twentieth-century European Marxist thinkers—
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) and György Lukács (1885-1971). Gramsci, in 
particular, developed a highly sophisticated alternative foundation for 
Marxist theory, rooted in a perspective of what we might call “total his-
toricism.” In this view, the only absolute reality, and thus the only means 
for determing meaning, is collective praxis. This is not only a denial of 
materialism—at least philosophical materialism as normally conceived—
but, as Leszek Kołakowski notes, amounts to a denial of any metaphysic 
whatsoever (976). In short, according to Gramsci, Marxism teaches that: 
“there is no ‘reality’ existing in and for itself [per sè stante, in sè e per sè] 
but only in historical relation to human beings who modify it” (Gramsci 
23). A strong critique of reductive materialism arises out of this “prag-
                                                                                                                                          
Jains, one of the three main heterodox philosophical systems of ancient India. Sadly, 
their original works have been lost, and thus we are left to glean what we can of their 
writings from the texts of their opponents—Buddhists, Jains, and Brahmanists. Despite 
this distorting influence, in the work of the early Indian materialists we see the 
combination—later to become central to both Epicurus and Marx—of both a radically 
physicalist conception of the universe and a conviction that human welfare is first and 
foremost material welfare. In other words, early materialism in India, although it opted 
out of both mainstream cosmology and the associated vision of a spiritual essence and 
destiny for humanity, it did not thereby revoke what we might call the ethical or even 
humanist imperative. Against the argument—found in orthodox texts—that the 
Cārvākas opposed all that was good in the Vedic tradition, Dale Riepe writes, “It may be 
said from the available material that Cārvākas hold truth, integrity, consistency, and 
freedom of thought in the highest esteem” (75).  
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matist” reading of Marxism: philosophical materialism, far from being 
the contrary of religion, is in fact the direct outcome of religious super-
stition: “it is like primitive common sense, the apparent ‘obviousness’ of 
which only conceals a lack of critical thought” (Kołakowski 977; see, for 
example, Gramsci 13). This Gramscian reading of a Marxian anti-
ontology seems to parallel the early Buddhist conception of reality as 
“that which is capable of objective action” (Sk. arthya-kriyā-samartham), 
as discussed by Rahul Sankrityayan: 
Sweets and bread are real because they are capable of ob-
jective action, i.e., they are capable of the objective action 
of nourishment of satisfying our hunger; but the sweets 
and bread seen in a dream are not real because they cannot 
satisfy our hunger; they are incapable of objective action. 
(Sankrityayan 6) 
Though Lukács’s interpretation of Marxism was in many respects more 
orthodox than that of Gramsci, he, too, attempted to pull Marxism back 
towards its Hegelian, historicist and humanistic roots. For Lukács, a 
common misunderstanding amongst both Marxist proponents and crit-
ics is that the dialectic is a “scientific method” that one applies “objec-
tively” to an independent reality “out there”; rather, Lukács argues, the 
dialectic is an “active constituent of the social reality to which it is ap-
plied as a method.” In short, for Lukács, Marxism is not a scientific de-
scription of historical reality but rather the theoretical consciousness of a 
particular group of people (that is, the proletariat) as they struggle towards 
existential-political liberation. 
Thus, to gloss Marx’s well known but easily misread phrase about 
changing the world rather than (merely) interpreting it, Lukács argues 
that the proletariat transforms the world in the very process of under-
standing it; these are “not two separate processes, but one and the same 
phenomenon.” Another way of framing this is to say that, in Lukács’s 
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Marxism, the Kantian division between “is” and “ought” breaks down; 
for in the revolutionary struggle, knowledge of the conditions leading to 
human emancipation coincide with actions to bring about this emanci-
pation—which ipso facto contains an ethical component. Moreover, this 
revolutionary knowledge/action brings freedom, because those involved 
in the struggle gain full consciousness of human possibility (that is, their 
“species-being” or “social beings”), while liberating themselves (and 
others) from the chains of selfish individualism. Just as there can be no 
such thing as an “armchair Buddhist”—that is, one who “knows of” the 
Dharma but does nothing to put these teachings into practice—so too 
there cannot be, for Lukács, a “theoretical Marxist,” because “the theory 
is nothing but the self-awareness of the movement” (Kołakowski 1003). 
Now of course, given what we have seen of the historical legacy 
of communist revolutions in the twentieth century, these ideals seem 
tremendously naive. However, the point I wish to make is that there are 
distinctive and surprising parallels in this revisionist Marxism with both 
traditional and modernist interpretations of Buddhism as a hybrid of 
teachings and practice that aim towards a “revolutionary” transfor-
mation of consciousness (and thus society) away from the “poisons” of 
greed, hatred and delusion. In that sense, it is no surprise that twentieth-
century radical Buddhists such as Seno’o Girō and B. R. Ambedkar were 
attracted to Marxist thought—even though they had no direct contact 
with either Marx’s early writings, or with the work of European Marxist 
revisionists such as Gramsci and Lukács.5  
                                                        
5 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a comparative dearth of positive references to Bud-
dhism in the work of twentieth and twenty-first century Western Marxists or Marxist 
sympathizers. The two exceptions are anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009), 
who spends a chapter of Tristes Tropiques (1955) discussing the “obvious” connections 
between Marxist and Buddhist criticism; and psychologist Erich Fromm (1900-1980), 
whose personal and professional connection to D. T. Suzuki from the 1950s resulted in 
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More recently, Bill Martin’s work picks up on some of the same 
critiques of earlier Marxist humanists like Gramsci and Lukács. In re-
sponse to the common pitfall of “reductive productivism”—“which 
might otherwise be expressed in the words ‘man does indeed live by 
bread alone’”—Martin develops a soft (or perhaps “linguistic”) material-
ism. Martin rejects a materialism of “brute stuff,” “where humans are 
simply one form of causally determined ‘material,’” in favor of a per-
spective that, although still rooted in materialist premises, particularly 
the heuristic or critical aspect, also gives pride of place to language, mean-
ing, and subjectivity. These, Martin asserts, “are peculiar ‘things’, and 
strange motions are generated as a result of their existence” (34). As 
such, they must be addressed by anyone involved in the task of social 
theory. 
As Martin notes, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was one of the most 
prominent students of Marx to recognize the singular flaw in Marxism—
or at least in the standard interpretations of Marxism—that is, the fact 
that “‘real, sensuous human beings’ (to use Marx’s language from the 
‘Theses on Feuerbach’) drop out of the picture in any theory, even an 
historical materialist theory, that takes history as working out according 
to strict laws” (Martin 37). In his Search for a Method, Sartre frames this 
tendency within mainstream Marxist thought in terms of a denial not so 
much of language but of particularity and contingency: 
Sartre proposes that the big, totalizing ‘system’ (in this 
case, of Hegel and Marx), requires a reassertion of the exis-
tential particular and singular, or else the system will have 
                                                                                                                                          
an increasing attempt to bring together a humanist Marxism and Zen (see for example, 
Psycholanalysis and Religion, 1950). Both Lévi-Strauss and Fromm have faced criticism for 
their “Buddhist Marxism”: the former from his student Jacques Derrida and, later, Bill 
Martin, and the latter from Leszek Kołakowski, who calls Fromm’s reading of Marxism 
selective and one-sided (1095-96). 
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an overwhelming tendency to not only totalize, but to pro-
claim itself the transcendental totalizer—in other words, 
God. A ‘thinking’ of the planet Earth that is unaware of the 
earth that is here, or there, or somewhere, or that sub-
sumes the particularities of this earth into a big concept 
and thereby obliterates the particularities, has the charac-
ter of the sort of cosmic, theological thinking in which fi-
nite beings do not count for much. It is undeniable that 
Marxism has gone down this path more than a few times, 
in theory and practice, thus Sartre’s corrective. (Martin 
273) 
Which leads me to pose the question, following on the work of 
the Critical Buddhists: Can Buddhism today provide recourse for “real, 
sensuous human beings”—that is, a humanistic materialism—or does it 
too, fall prey (as Jacques Derrida and Martin both suggest) to a similar 
tendency towards “ahistorical historicity” and the “drama (or dharma) 
of interiority”? Can Buddhism add anything to this debate? Before mov-
ing on to examine some Buddhist “responses,” to the challenge of Marx-
ian materialism, I will briefly examine some historical connections be-
tween Buddhism and Marxism. 
 
Buddhism and Marxism: Historical Connections 
The conversations between Asian Buddhism and Marxism began surpris-
ingly early; that is, very soon after Marx’s death in 1883. In the tumultu-
ous decades between the 1880s and the 1930s, increasing contact be-
tween Western Marxists—both intellectuals and activists—and Asian 
progressives and radicals, in addition to greater exposure on the part of 
Asian intellectuals to the texts of Marx and Engels and an outpouring of 
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secondary literature emerging from Europe and eventually Asia, made 
such a dialogue inevitable. This was especially true in Japan, which dur-
ing these six decades was experiencing significant upheavals in religion, 
economics, politics and ideology. Unsurprisingly, it is in the context of a 
modernizing Japan—where truly, all that was once solid was melting rap-
idly into air—that the conversation between Buddhism and progressive 
and radical politics was most intense and arguably most fertile.6 
As early as 1882, the founder of the Eastern Socialist Party (Tōyō 
Shakaitō) Tarui Tōkichi (1850-1922) wrote that the “children of the Bud-
dha” had a special mandate to look upon the people with compassion. At 
about the same time, Katayama Sen (1859-1933) began promoting a 
“spiritual socialism” founded on both Christian and Buddhist ideals. Alt-
hough the early Shōwa scholar Tanaka Sōgorō (1894-1961) viewed social-
ism as a mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism and western ideas, others 
felt that the Mahāyāna insistence on compassion was enough to render 
the Buddhist traditions of East Asia socialist in nature. Though most of 
the self-consciously modernizing “New Buddhists” of the early twentieth 
century were resistant to socialism, a few, such as Mōri Shian, were 
sympathetic to the Commoner’s Society (Heiminsha), founded in 1903. 
The final years of the Meiji period saw a turn towards Buddhist socialism 
in the writings of Shin priest Takagi Kenmyō (1864-1914)—for whom so-
                                                        
6 I will focus here on the cases of Buddhist-Marxist dialogue in Japan, for two reasons: a) 
it is the context I am most familiar with; and b) Japan, by virtue of the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868 and the ensuing attempt to “modernize” at breakneck speed, was the Asian 
country most “open” to Western political ideals, including, at least until the 1930s, rad-
ical ones. Having said, I would be remiss in failing to note that there were early experi-
ments in Buddhist Marxism in south Asia, and India in particular, as far back as the 
1880s, with the work of Iyothee Thass (1845-1914), a founder of the Dravidian Self-
Respect movement, and, somewhat later, Lakshmi Narasu (1861-1934), Kumaran Asan 
(1873-1924) and Bodhanand Mahasthvir (1874-1952). As Braj Mani argues, these figures 
can be seen as forerunners to the work of Ambedkar in the 1950s; see Mani, “Dr. 
Ambedkar’s Predecessors.”  
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cialism was “much more deeply related to religion than to politics” (Tak-
agi 55)—and, most dramatically, in the famous case of Uchiyama Gudō 
(1874-1911), the Sōtō Zen priest who protested against rural poverty as 
“unjust and anti-Buddhist,” and, as a result, was arrested and executed 
on trumped up charges of plotting to assassinate the Emperor in what is 
known as the High Treason Incident (Taigyaku Jiken). Even the writings 
of the Shin sect reformer Kiyozawa Manshi (1863-1903)—whose “spiritu-
alism” (seishinshugi) comes under criticism from progressive Buddhists—
contain hints of utopian socialism, for example, his references to a “Bud-
dhist country” (nyorai no kokka) that might one day replace the present 
capitalistic and materialistic one. 
And yet, by far the most significant theorist of Buddhist Marxism 
in Japan prior to the Second World War was Seno’o Girō (1889-1962), 
founder of the Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism, a Buddhist so-
cialist movement based on the straightfoward notion that the capitalist 
system generates suffering and, thus, violates the spirit of Buddhism. 
Although the League itself was shortlived, caught in the maelstrom of 
ultranationalist ideology sweeping Japan in the mid-1930s, Seno’o’s ideas 
about the connections between Buddhism and Marxism, and particularly 
his thoughts about ethics, the self, and materialism, remain of great sig-
nificance in rethinking Buddhist progressive politics in the twenty-first 
century. Along with Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (1891-1956), the Indian Buddhist 
political activist often cited as a father of Socially Engaged Buddhism, 
Seno’o’s work grapples with the problems and possibilities of Marxist 
Buddhism (or Buddhist Marxism). As I have written extensively of 
Seno’o’s life, work and thought elsewhere (for example, Shields “Blue-
print,” Shields “Life and Thought”), I will confine myself here to an anal-
ysis of several of the most significant problems and possibilities raised in 
his work, as well as the work of other progressive and radical Buddhists 
of the past century. 
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Grasping Things by the (Selfless) Root7 
Where, exactly, do Buddhism and Marxism meet? What, in particular, 
are the points of contact that have allowed this dialogue to exist? For 
radical Buddhists, as well as sympathetic Western theorists such as 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009) and Erich Fromm (1900-1980), the con-
nection was obvious. Both Buddhism and Marxism take the following 
question as their fundamental point of departure: How are human beings 
to be reconciled with themselves and the world? Furthermore, both assert 
that the human condition is one of rampant suffering, and that suffering 
is both physical and cognitive/emotional. Finally, both Buddhism and 
Marxism, at least in theory, aim to provide some form of liberation from 
suffering—understood, certainly for Marxists and usually for Buddhists, 
in a this-worldly fashion. 
Moreover, both Buddhism and Marxism, as generally interpreted, 
provide tools for a critical analysis of ordinary existence—towards the 
goal of (radical?) change. In addition, both traditions call for a significant 
transformation of consciousness, which is assumed to bring about an end to 
alienation as well as selfish individualism—or, in the case of Buddhism, the 
illusion of the self. And yet, in both traditions, alienation or suffering 
cannot be overcome simply by thought alone—practice is neccesary (al-
beit the traditions differ on the forms of practice required). Both Bud-
dhism and Marxism emphasize a deep recognition of causality; suffering 
can only be eliminated by removing its causes (though here, again, what 
                                                        
7 “The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material 
force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force 
as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon 
as it demonstrates ad hominem—as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp 
the root of the matter. But for man, the root is man himself” (Marx, Contribution 182). 
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thay means will differ between the two traditions). And finally, we might 
add that, just as Buddhism is difficult to categorize under the limiting 
rubrics of “philosophy” and “religion,” so too Marxism, although obvi-
ously rooted in a distinctive philosophical tradition, aims to present a 
global perspective on human affairs, one that—at least potentially—
intrudes upon various disciplines and such as psychology, sociology, 
economics and politics. Indeed, perhaps the major stumbling-block to 
interpreting the work of Marx is its hugely ambitious scope. Far too 
many of his many epigones forget that: 
Marx was not an academic writer but a humanist in the Re-
naissance sense of the term: his mind was concerned with 
the totality of human affairs, and his vision of social libera-
tion embraced, as an interdependent whole, all the major 
problems with which humanity is faced… Marx’s own pur-
pose…was to provide a global interpretation of human be-
haviour and history and to reconstruct an integral theory 
of mankind in which particular questions are only signifi-
cant in relation to the whole. (Kołakowski 8-9) 
Let me begin with the first point of correspondence raised above. 
It goes without saying that Buddhist tradition is rooted in a concept of 
“liberation”—and that liberation is understood by all Buddhists as a lib-
eration from “suffering.” That much, again, is uncontroversial. Things 
begin to become more cloudy, however, when we start to deconstruct 
the early Buddhist terms for suffering: duḥkha (Sanskrit) and dukkha (Pa-
li). Many contemporary scholars point to the problems with the transla-
tion of these terms as “suffering,” suggesting a more complex host of 
inter-related connotations including “dissatisfaction,” “dis-ease,” or “al-
ienation.” Clearly, the term includes not only physical pain and discom-
fort, but also, and seemingly more importantly, cognitive and emotional 
forms of dissatisfaction or alienation—rooted primarily in an inability 
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and unwillingness to accept change. Perhaps the best way to summarize 
this idea, which is formulated in the classic set of teachings known as the 
Four Noble Truths, is that liberation from suffering entails a radical 
transformation of personal existence, which is traditionally understood 
as resulting in a condition known as nirvāṇa or “release.” Although this 
release has implications in Buddhist tradition for what happens upon 
one’s death, the primary significance is what occurs in this world; that is, 
in the here and now. There are, of course, a multitude of interpretations 
of how this transformation in enacted, and what it implies for the “self” 
and world, but for now I would like to leave this matter in order to ex-
plore the traditional Marxian understanding of liberation. 
On the Marxist side, things are equally if not more complex. De-
spite the fact that most Marxists have understood Marxist liberation in 
purely materialistic terms; that is, a release, via political and economic 
revolution, from all forms of suffering associated with economic poverty, 
social mistreatment and political injustice, Marx was primarily con-
cerned with alienation and dehumanization as the fundamental problems 
of human existence; and one that affects not only the proletariat but all 
humans, to some degree.8 Indeed, according to some Marxist scholars, 
such as Bill Martin and Leszek Kołakowski, mainstream or orthodox 
Marxism (including the influential work of Engels and Lenin) has deviat-
ed significantly from the ideas of Marx—especially early Marx—in adopt-
ing and promoting a form of “reductivist” philosophical materialism that 
                                                        
8 “Dehumanization, although in a different form, is also an attribute of the possessing 
class, but the privileges that class enjoys prevent it from being clearly aware of its own 
dehumanized condition, in which it rejoices instead of chafing at it” (Kołakowski 183). 
Compare traditional Buddhist cosmology, and idea that, although the rebirth realm of 
gods (and perhaps asuras) is in some sense ‘higher’ than that of humanity, it is better to 
be reborn as a human, precisely because only humans experience a ‘balance’ of pleas-
ure and suffering that allows them the capacity to ‘recognize’ suffering and attempt to 
overcome it by entering the stream and becoming a buddha.  
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ultimately leads to a fixation with Truth and subsequent devalorization 
of particular human beings.9 Another way to put this—reflecting the cri-
tique raised by Deleuze, Gramsci, Lukàcs and Sartre—is that the noological 
element of Marxian thought is completely displaced by the physicalist 
element. I would like to argue that a revisioning of Marxian theory of 
liberation along noological lines allows for a closer connection, and 
greater ease of cross-fertilization, between Marxist and Buddhist 
thought. 
 
Species Being, No-Self  and Buddha Nature 
Though Marx is well-known as a fierce critic of (Western) religious dog-
ma, ritual and institutions, I argue that his vision of human liberation 
can be read as the clearest and most sustained attempt in Western 
thought since the classical Greeks to reconnect the realms of individual 
and communal flourishing (and also of suffering)—and in such a way that 
is, I suggest, palpably “Buddhistic.” Marx, too, understood the potential 
in politics for fundamental, all-encompassing human liberation (as well 
as its opposite). Marx’s starting point, was not, as is sometimes assumed, 
poverty, but rather dehumanization: “the fact that individuals are alienat-
                                                        
9 “For Marx, and this is one of a number of areas where Engels… just didn’t seem to ‘get 
it’, materialism is not first of all a matter of some (in reality, quasi-theological) alle-
giance to an ontology (a theory about what sorts of substances there are in or underly-
ing the world), but instead the material of what Marx called, in the famous ‘Theses on 
Feuerbach’, sensuous human practices. We learn from practices. Our practices ulti-
mately take place in the context of the forms of which human life is produced, perpetu-
ated, and reproduced. These forms, at least beyond tribal societies that are not based on 
class division…, depend on divisions of labor, especially between mental and manual 
labor, and on a division between those who control the means of production and those 
who do not” (Martin 317).  
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ed from their own labour and its material, spiritual, and social conse-
quences in the form of goods, ideas, and political institutions, and not 
only from these but from their fellow beings and, ultimately, from them-
selves” (Kołakowski 183). In his essay “On the Jewish Question” (1843), 
Marx develops his ideas of social emancipation in such a way as to push 
beyond merely political liberation towards full “human emancipation.” 
He contextualizes his argument by criticizing Bruno Bauer’s call for lib-
erating the state from religion, arguing that Bauer, as many others, had 
it backwards: “religious restrictions were not a cause of secular ones, but 
a manifestation of them.” 
The political emancipation from religion is not a religious 
emancipation that has been carried through to completion 
and is free from contradiction, because political emancipa-
tion is not a form of human emancipation which has been 
carried through to completion and is free from contradic-
tion…. The perfect political state is, by its nature, man’s spe-
cies-life, as opposed to his material life. All the precondi-
tions of this egoistic life continue to exist in civil society out-
side the sphere of the state, but as qualities of civil society. 
Where the political state has attained its true development, 
man—not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, 
in life—leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: 
life in the political community, in which he considers himself 
a communal being, and life in civil society, in which he acts 
as a private individual, regards other men a means, de-
grades himself into a means, and becomes the plaything of 
alien powers. (Marx, “Jewish” 152-54) 
For Marx, Bauer’s idea, like the fundamental premise of the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man and the United States Constitution, is limited 
and ultimately self-defeating, as it merely solidifies a theory of rights 
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based on monadic individualism. In short, the state “does not help to 
abolish the egoistic character of private life but merely provides it with a 
legal framework.” And thus, political revolution “does not liberate peo-
ple from religion or the rule of property, it merely gives them the right 
to hold property and to profess their own religion.” In short: 
Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself 
the abstract, and as an individual human being has become 
a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, 
and in his particular situation, only when man has recog-
nized and organized his “forces propres” as social forces, and 
consequently no longer separates social power from him-
self in the shape of political power, only then will human 
emancipation have been accomplished. (Marx “Jewish” 
168). 
With this notion of “an integrated human being overcoming his 
own division between private interest and the community,” Marx devel-
ops a conception of humanity that is, in the Western philosophical con-
text, radical if not entirely unprecedented. What sometimes goes unno-
ticed, however, is that in developing this thought Marx effectively dis-
places religion from the focus of his critique—unlike Feuerbach (or Ba-
con), Marx sees religion/superstition as one among many other manifes-
tations of social servitude, rather than its root. The true “recovery” of 
humanity comes from “the free recognition by each individual of himself 
as the bearer of the community”—a task that resonates well with a pri-
mary thrust of many of the world’s religions, including Buddhism.10 
                                                        
10 With respect to a plausible Buddhist interpretation of “species-being” in relation to 
karma, see Hershock 41. 
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Although the above ideas, expressed in “On the Jewish Question” 
and Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, would later be dismissed by Marx 
himself as “utopian”—that is, positing an imagined unity in abstract 
terms—we cannot so readily dismiss the fundamental insight here. 
Moreover, even in his later, more “scientific” writings, the necessity of a 
transformation of consciousness—an awakening to social ontology as 
means of overcoming alienation—remains a key element. Somewhat akin 
to the realization of Buddha-nature in some Mahāyāna texts and tradi-
tions, Marx’s reformed consciousness was not simply a conscious turn 
towards an arbitrary ideal, but a revelation and explication of something 
that had already been there, albeit in an implicit fashion—a conversion 
of “an unconscious historical tendency into a conscious one, an objective 
trend into an act of will.” In other words, revolution was not about con-
verting reality into something new (via the will or obligation), but un-
derstanding reality more fully (via a transformed consciousness, though 
one not separated from activity). This is perhaps best summarized in the 
following quote from Marx’s Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philoso-
phy of Law, which sets the famous “opiate” condemnation in a broader 
context, and hints at subtleties often ignored in Marx’s perspective on 
religion vis-à-vis politics and criticism. 
Religion is the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man 
who has either not yet found himself or has already lost 
himself again. But man is no abstract being encamped out-
side the world. Man is the world of man, the state, society. 
This state, this society, produces religion, an inverted con-
sciousmness, because they are an inverted world. Religion is . 
. . the fantastic realisation of the human essence because 
the human essence has no true reality. The struggle against 
religion is therefore indirectly a fight against the world of 
which religion is the spiritual aroma. . . [Religion] is the 
opium of the people. To abolish religion as the illusory 
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happiness of the people is to demand their real happiness. 
The demand to give up illusions about the existing state of 
affairs is the demand to give up a state of affairs which needs il-
lusions… The immediate task of philosophy, which is at the 
service of history, once the holy form of self-estrangement 
has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in its 
unholy forms. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into criti-
cism of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of 
law and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics. 
(Marx Contribution 175-76) 
As Leszek Kołakowski notes, contrary to common misperceptions, 
Marxian socialism never involved the “extinction of individuality” or a 
leveling for the sake of some “universal good”—though this was charac-
teristic of many previous (often monastically-inspired) communist doc-
trines. For Marx, rather: 
socialism represented the full emancipation of the individ-
ual by the destruction of the web of mystification which 
turned community life into a world of estrangement pre-
sided over by an alienated bureaucracy. Marx’s ideal was 
that every man should be fully aware of his own character 
as a social being, but should also, for this very reason, be 
capable of developing his personal aptitudes in all their 
fullness and variety. There was no question of the individu-
al being reduced to a universal species-being; what Marx 
desired to see was a community in which the sources of an-
tagonism among individuals were done away with. This an-
tagonism sprang, in his view, from the mutual isolation 
that is bound to arise when political life is divorced from 
civil society, while the institution of private property 
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means that people can only assert their own individuality 
in opposition to others. (Kołakowski 107-8) 
Thus, for Marx an overcoming of alienation—and dehumaniza-
tion—involves nothing less than a recovery—via revolution—of humani-
ty’s “species-being” (alternatively called “social being”). At one level, to 
make this claim is to assume that humanity has some sort of “essence,” 
and that Marx, or the proletariat, know what that is. And yet, as 
Kołakowski persuasively argues, human nature or the “self” for Marx is 
not conceived as “a set of features which may be empirically ascer-
tained,” but rather“as “a set of requirements that must be fulfilled in or-
der to make human beings genuinely human.” In other words, although 
Marx does indeed presuppose a non-historical norm of humanity, this is 
“not a collection of permanent, unchanging qualities belonging to some 
arbitrary ideal, but a conception of the conditions of development ena-
bling men to display their creative powers to the full, untrammelled by 
material needs” (Kołakowski 217-18). Human fulfillment, then, is not a 
matter of attaining some sort of utopian state of perfection, but rather of 
liberating humanity from the conditions that make us the slaves of our 
own works. 
 
World-Denying Buddhism? 
One counter to the argument that Buddhism can contribute meaningful-
ly to the discussion of a revised materialism is the common conception 
that Buddhism—to some extent qua religion, but even more so by virtue 
of it ascetic qualities—is simply incompatible with materialism. Without 
getting into the problematic and arguably modernistic bias in the as-
sumption that religions are prima facie rooted in idealist metaphysics, 
this point needs to be addressed. Certainly there are ascetic roots to In-
dian Buddhist monasticism; a simple, abstemious life was and remains 
483 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
 
 
 
for the most part a non-negotiable requirement for membership in the 
sangha. No one would dispute that “materialism” in the (“consumerist”) 
sense of “fulfillment of life via the pursuit and attainment of material 
possessions” is unacceptable by any Buddhist standard. And yet, this is 
surely true of most or all normatively inclined thought traditions—
including Marxism. After all, alienation in Marx’s thought is nothing less 
than the subjugation of humanity by its own works; that is, through “rei-
fication” (Lukács) or “commodity fetishism” (Marx), which might be 
summarized as “the inability of human beings to see their own products 
for what they are, and their unwilling consent to be enslaved by human 
power instead of wielding it” (Kołakowski 227; see Marx Capital, Volume I, 
and Lukács History and Class Consciousness). 
The somewhat weaker, “hedonistic” form of materialism is 
somewhat more complex; and yet, this need not be merely a form of 
“selfish” pleasure-seeking, but may in fact amount to a valorization of 
the simple, the mundane, and the everyday (one thinks here of the hum-
ble and potentially Buddhistic “hedonism” of Thoreau’s Walden). Perhaps 
the strongest case to be made for a Buddhism that embraces a limited 
hedonistic materialism (that is, of the Thoreauian sort) would be the 
Chan/Zen traditions that emerged out of a medieval and early modern 
Sino-Japanese cultural context. 
Moving further among types of materialism, we come to the phil-
osophical materialism generally accepted by Marxists, following upon 
classical and Enlightenment thinkers such as Democritus, Lucretius and 
Bacon. Here the emphasis is less on pleasure than on an acceptance of the 
conditioning power of material relations. And yet, as noted in the first sec-
tions of this essay, even here there is some dispute within Marxist theo-
ry. Although Engels and Lenin, along with most orthodox Marxists, fol-
lowed the materialist emphasis on matter as the foundation of meaning 
and value, Marx himself clearly understood materialism less as a theory 
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about reality—an ontology or metaphysic—than a “warning” against the 
tendency to privilege ideals and totalities at the expense of particularity 
and contingency, and the “human.” At the heart of Marxian materialism 
is a fundamental element of critique; one that points towards causal fac-
tors that may otherwise go unnoticed in our attempts to discern—and 
ultimately address—our existential situatedness.    
Another related concept deeply embedded in Marx’s writings is 
the unity of theory and practice—understood as praxis or the practical 
interpretation of human consciousness.11 Though this slogan is often 
employed by Engels and later Marxists, what it frequently amounted to 
was the straightforward idea that practice was the basis of knowledge 
and the touchstone of truth—or, alternatively, that a theory can only be 
judged by its “fruits.” Although there is some merit to both of these in-
terpretations, they miss the more fundamental and subtle Marxian 
thrust, which is part of his more general critique of the “contemplative” 
or “transcendental” conception of knowledge; that is, the “traditional 
[Western] conception of truth as consisting in the conformity of our 
judgement with a state of affairs completely independent of our cogni-
tive activity” (Kołakowski 1035). Knowledge in this familiar scenario ul-
timately amounts to a passive reception of a world “out there.” 
The Marxian critique of contemplative knowledge, which aligns 
with Rorty’s “constructivist” preference for Bacon over Descartes, noted 
above, has rarely been revisited since Marx’s time, but it seems to be an-
other potentially fertile point of contact/contrast with traditional Bud-
dhist thought—and one that has especial implications for a reconstruct-
ed Buddhist materialism. The emphasis on the “mind” in early Buddhist 
thought—as one finds expressed, for example, in the opening stanzas of 
                                                        
11 One of the only Marxist thinkers to take up this issue in earnest was Karl Korsch 
(1886-1961), who saw it as the very essence of Marxism. See, for example, his Marxismus 
und Philosophie (1923). 
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the Dhammapada—seem to suggest that Buddhism, too, may fall into a 
into the contemplative or transcendental trap. In an article entitled 
“Buddhist Dialectics,” Rahul Sankrityayan argues that “Buddhism in its 
highest and final form is in a large measure similar to the idealism of He-
gel”—in particular, the Yogācāra school, with its emphasis on the idea 
(vijñāna) that is at once dynamic and nonmaterial. (Sankrityayan 3) 
And yet, it is equally clear that even early Indian Buddhism 
placed a high premium on engagement with the world—whether as a 
bhikkhu or a “lay” follower. Arguably, the closest equivalent to the Marx-
ian conception of knowledge as a unity of theory and practice in terms 
that might be considered “political” comes from the writings of twelfth-
century Japanese sect founder Nichiren, for whom “there is only one sa-
hā world. Vulture Peak, the place where the Lotus Sutra is taught, repre-
sents both this world of ours and the most perfect world, the only possi-
ble ‘paradise’. There is no other reality, neither for humanity, nor for the 
Buddha” (Dolce 232-33). The point is not, for Nichiren, that we are pres-
ently living in the perfect world, but rather that we are living in a world 
that is, with faith, dedication, and great effort—”perfectible.” As Linda 
Dolce puts it, his emphasis “is not on the absolute per se, but on the rela-
tive that has to become absolute” (Dolce 235). As I have argued else-
where, this is the primary source for the ineluctable political dimension 
of Nichiren Buddhism from the Kamakura period through today (see 
Shields “Lotus Sutra”). 
 
Rethinking Buddhism Materialism: Seno’o Girō  
Given the above, it hardly comes as a surprise that Seno’o Girō, the early 
twentieth-century Buddhist thinker most invested in establishing a 
practicable Buddhist Marxism, was himself working on explicitly 
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Nichirenist premises (though he distanced himself from the Nichiren 
institution). In his writings, Seno’o insists on a comprehensive under-
standing of the causes and conditions of poverty—and subsequent de-
humanization of the poor. Because, he argues, these causes and condi-
tion are both material and non-material, then naturally the solutions to 
poverty/alienation must also—against orthodox Marxists but in line 
with some Marxist revisionists—include aspects of human existence that 
go beyond the purely material (Seno’o 1975, 312-13, 386). Seno’o came to 
reject the metaphysics of harmony—what Critical Buddhists would later 
call “topicalism”—found within much of the Mahāyāna philosophical 
tradition, and reaching a peak within the so-called Tendai synthesis. It is 
perhaps more accurate to say that—in developing his commitment to 
Nichirenism (Nichirenshugi)—Seno’o came to see harmony and the over-
arching vison of totality presented in Mahāyāna/Tendai thought and the 
Lotus Sutra as a goal to be reached through historical (including econom-
ic and political) transformation, rather than an a prior ontological 
ground that must simply be recognized (see Lai 1984, 22). In similar fash-
ion, suffering was an existential condition to be analyzed and eliminated, 
rather than—as some within the Tendai and associated traditions would 
have it, and as some contemporary critics of Buddhism assert—an illuso-
ry concept to be transcended via a dialectics of emptiness or a deeper 
realization of Buddha-nature. 
In making his case for materalism against the pitfalls of abstract 
idealism, Seno’o is quick to note that the importance of “love” (ai), 
which, he argues, “is neither a concept nor an illusion,” but rather a 
practice (jissen)—and one that, when properly accompanied by objective 
criticism, allows us to recognize (the problems of) ordinary life” (Seno’o 
1975, 363). Here, Seno’o’s activist interpretation of Buddhist compassion 
is brought in to soften the otherwise hard-edged Marxist critique. Bud-
dhist love—embodied in the way of the bodhisattva—provides the hu-
manist foundation for social revolution. In the same essay, Seno’o insists 
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that his Youth League is more than simply an economic movement (tan 
naru keizai undō), but rather one that promotes a “new idealism” (shin 
risōshugi—note that this is not the same as seishinshugi, “spirit-ism”) and 
a “new humanism” (shin jindōshugi) in order to construct a “pure bud-
dha-land” (jōbukkokudo) in this world. In some sense, whether he was 
aware of it or not, Seno’o was actually restating a point made by Marx in 
his later writings, warning against the tendency of traditional philosoph-
ical materialists to neglect social engagement; that is, to merely interpret 
the world, rather than attempt to change it. 
In further elaborating what Buddhism can bring to socialist anal-
ysis and critique, Seno’o notes that at the root of the Buddhist worldview 
is a fundamental conception of the interdependence of matter and mind, 
and of mind and form. Thus it would be a huge mistake to simply reduce 
problems of economic welfare and the need for social restructuring to 
purely material concerns. Rather, progressive Buddhists must demand a 
movement that allows for the development of social existence in its var-
ious facets. For Seno’o, this entails a recognition of the fuller implica-
tions of the social extension of the Buddhist doctrine of no-self—
alternately rendered mugaizumu, mugashugi, or muga-ai (Seno’o 1975, 
367). This term becomes, for Seno’o, the very embodiment of the Dhar-
ma, and must replace any and all attempts to find salvation by way of 
“idealistic abstractions” such as Pure Land’s Amida, Shingon’s Dainichi, 
and the Eternal Buddha of the Lotus Sutra (Seno’o 1975, 378). 
Also of note is Seno’o’s emphasis on awakening as “human libera-
tion”—which adds a communal element lacking in most traditional ren-
derings of the experience of nirvana or satori. The term kaihō is in fact 
best translated as liberation or emancipation, and is generally used to 
apply to social or political freedom as understood in Western liberal and 
progressive traditions (for example, women’s liberation movement: josei 
kaihō undō; emancipation of serfs: nōdo kaihō; liberation theology: kaihō 
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shingaku). In Seno’o’s reading of early Buddhism—or at least the funda-
mental teachings of Śākyamuni as he understands them—there is a deci-
sive rejection of the existence of superhuman forces of any sort and a 
focus on contingency and the practice of selfless copassion for others. It 
is this unrelenting commitment to humanism that forms the bridge be-
tween Buddha and Marx, and forms a tool of critical resistance to the 
“nonsense” forms of Buddhism that practice reverence to superhuman 
beings, as well as to forms of Indian and Abrahamic theism. 
 
Dharmic Materialism as Non-reductive Physicalism 
In the following section, I would like to extrapolate upon Seno’o’s analy-
sis, because it gets to the heart of what I have been calling Dharmic ma-
terialism, and extrapolate this framework onto contemporary move-
ments of socially engaged Buddhism. Wary of the tendency of ideologies, 
even or especially progressive ones, to lead to extremism, Dharmic ma-
terialism seeks a balance by focusing on both the significance of material 
needs and structural suffering on the one hand, and the problem of abso-
lutist or reductive thinking—which slides so easily into scientism and 
antihumanism—on the other. The problem with conventional Marxism, 
for Seno’o, lies in its absolute commitment to materialism as an ideology, 
rooted in an understanding of philosophical materialism as an ontologi-
cal statement about the way things are—rather than a pragmatic sugges-
tion about how best to transform self, community and world. Another 
way to say this is that, for Engels and most Marxists after Marx (and per-
haps even, at times, Marx himself), the fundamental, radical insights of 
historical and dialectical materialism—which asserts a potentially Bud-
dhistic understanding of change, transformation, and contradiction—are 
overturned by a static and limiting conception of unchanging reality, one 
that ultimately privileges material being/suffering/satisfaction over all 
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else, including emotional and mental being/suffering/satisfaction. And 
to clarify, this is not identical to the more standard critique—common to 
religiously-inclined progressives such as Leo Tolstoy, Takagi Kenmyō 
and B. R. Ambedkar—that laments the Marxist rejection of so-called 
higher “spiritual” ideals. Seno’o’s critique is more subtle: it is not a mat-
ter of judging whether spirit or matter is higher, but of questioning a 
commitment to any form of metaphysics, whether materialist, idealist, 
or otherwise. 
In addition to the work of Marxist revisionists like Gramsci, Lu-
kács, and Sartre, we might see a parallel between Seno’o’s Dharmic ma-
terialism—which aspires to be both pragmatic and humanist—and the 
non-reductive physicalism of American pragmatist thinker Richard Rorty. 
Without going too much into the details of Rorty’s argument, which 
draws heavily on the prior work of Donald Davidson, the central thesis 
behind non-reductive physicalism is the dual assertion that: a) “every 
event can be described in micro-structural terms, a description which 
mentions on elementary particles, and can be explained by reference to 
other events so described”; and b) “‘reduction’ is a relation merely be-
tween linguistic items, not among ontological categories” (Rorty “Physi-
calism” 114-15). In other words, although the world of objects and events 
can be traced, as most contemporary scientists would have it, to elemen-
tary physical levels, these levels are not more real than any other, and 
the use and relevance of such descriptions will depend primarily on con-
text and intentions. Davidson himself showed that a materialist perspec-
tive does not rule out “anomalies”—that is, “pockets within the material 
world that, though they are the product of causal interactions, do not 
themselves follow strict causality.” Following both Marx and Darwin, we 
might say that humanity itself is one such anomaly, given that, unlike all 
other species, we make our own means of subsistence. As Bill Martin ar-
gues, this fact cannot be separated from other phenomena that make for 
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the human form of being: “language, meaning, valuation, consciousness 
and self-consciousness, a deep concern for finitude and mortality, and 
the attendant concern for ‘something more’, life more abundant” (403).12 
To some extent, this may be obvious to anyone but a philosopher, 
but as Rorty puts it: “the best way to predict the behavior of tables will 
probably remain to talk about them qua tables rather than as collections 
of particles or as fuzzy replicas of the Platonic archetypal Table” (Rorty 
“Physicalism” 115-16). Another way of putting this is to say that reduc-
tionist materialism contains a lingering commitment to metaphysics, 
whereby the deeper material structure of an object (or an event) be-
comes its “truth” or “essence.” In contemporary society, this leads to the 
phenomenon of scientism. Now, given the anti-essentialist stance of tra-
ditional Buddhism, it is not hard to see why even traditional Buddhists 
would reject such reductionist thinking. The key here is, however, that is 
not the materialist or physicalist aspect that is the problem, but rather 
the metaphysical assumptions that often cling to a materialist analysis of 
history and society.13  For both Rorty and Seno’o, to dispense with mate-
rialism (or physicalism) is to throw out the baby with the bathwater. 
Moving from philosophical analysis back to social theory, let us 
look briefly at how Dharmic materialism relates, if at all, to contempo-
rary movements of socially engaged Buddhism. Perhaps the first attempt 
by a Western scholar to bring together Buddhism and economics was E. 
F. Schumacher’s classic essay entitled “Buddhist Economics,” first pub-
                                                        
12 Compare, in this regard, Peter Hershock’s reflection on a Buddhist conception of “lib-
erating change” (Hershock 94). 
13 Given the theme of this essay, it is also of note that Rorty’s piece was originally 
written for a presentation at the Institute of Philosophy of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, and originally appeared in Chinese translation. This may be why Rorty 
remarks that the bridging accomplished by non-reductive physicalism goes against the 
grain of Western philosophical tradition—so much so that the acceptance of such by 
the culture at large might even render the culture nonwestern.  
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lished in 1966 but reprinted as a chapter in his bestselling 1973 book 
Small is Beautiful. Here Schumacher presents a sweeping critique of West-
ern development models, arguing instead for a “Middle Way between 
materialist heedlessness and traditionalist immobility” (56). In this 
phrase we hear distinct echoes of Seno’o Giro and the Youth League for 
Revitalizing Buddhism, particularly in the insistence on the importance 
of Buddhist action and engagement in the face of institutional tenden-
cies towards accepting the status quo, whether economic, social or polit-
ical. One important distinction, however, is that Seno’o analysis probes 
beyond a critique of “materialist heedlessness” towards a more nuanced 
appraisal of materialism as a philosophical position. 
Other, more recent attempts to work out a “Buddhist economics” 
fall prey to then sort of idealism that Seno’o ruthlessly criticized. For in-
stance, H. N. S. Karunatilake’s analysis in This Confused Society (1976) 
looks back wistfully to the age of the Mauryan Emperor Asoka as a mod-
el, painting an idyllic picture of a co-operative and harmonious agrarian 
community (Karunatilake; see Harvey 216-17). Still more recent attempts 
to constuct a Buddhist ecomonics tend to focus on a critique of consum-
erism rather than meterialism per se, and thus, although undoubtedly of 
use, move further away form the structural and anti-metaphysical cri-
tique offered by Seno’o Girō. Thus, both P. A. Payutto, author of the 1994 
work Buddhist Economics: A Middle Way for the Market Place, and Bud-
dhadasa Bhikku, who espoused a form of Dhammic socialism, focus their 
critique on the “worldly” character of both capitalist and communist 
systems, upholding an idealized Buddhist tradition as the moral exem-
plar (see Santikaro). Although more nuanced in his appreciation of of the 
complexities of Marxist thought, Ambedkar, too, shares with these later 
critics a tendency towards a reading of Marxism on the basis of its most 
problematic “fruits,” while giving historical Buddhism a pass in favor of 
a highly idealized dhamma (see Ambedkar). 
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The basic thesis presented by Payutto is familiar: an idealized and 
dehistoricized “Buddhism” becomes the new “middle way” (or even 
“third way”) between the two dominant socio-economic systems of the 
twentieth century: capitalism and state socialism. It is not hard to tear 
this picture apart. First, as noted, “Buddhism” is abstracted from its ac-
tual historical effects and embeddedness in states and societies. Second, 
now that actual state socialism has largely gone the way of the dodo, the 
pressing need to bridge the imagined divide also withers away. This, I 
believe, gives us an opportunity to rethink not only Buddhism in its rela-
tion to socio-economic forms but also to reconsider socialism and com-
munism—particularly their understandning of and commitment to phil-
osophical materialism.14 In short, we might say that contemporary Bud-
dhist or Buddhist-inspired critiques of economics tend to espouse indi-
vidual, moral transformation rather than structural change, and thus 
focus less on materialism as a philosophical stance than as a synonym for 
consumerist acquisition (or “commodity fetishism”). They also often 
present an idealized vision of Buddhist tradition, which is contrasted fa-
vorably to a Western tradition or traditions ostensibly rooted in greed, 
selfishness, and individualism. As such, they fail to examine problems 
rooted within Buddhism, such as the tendency towards forms of idealism 
and trenscendence—or what Critical Buddhists call topicalism.  
 
From Materialism to (Non-)Subjectivity 
The difference between materialism (I mean good material-
ism) and idealism in philosophy might be understood as 
follows: with materialist philosophy there is always more 
                                                        
14 I am inspired here by a recent series of writings by mainly European thinkers under 
the lead of Alain Badou and Slavoj Žižek regarding the potential rebirth of what Badou 
calls “the communist hypothesis.” 
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to do and more to learn (and in this sense it resists “meta-
physics”), while idealism proceeds from the self-conception 
that, when it is finally “done right,” there will be nothing 
left to do. 
– Bill Martin, Ethical Marxism, p. 363 
 
Let me summarize briefly my Dharmic revisioning of Marx’s concept of 
liberation inspired by the work of Seno’o Girō and Marxist revisionists 
such as Gramsci. For Marx, the disarray of capitalist production affords 
the opportunity for the majority of suffering people to organize itself in 
a movement of protest and thus become conscious of its own revolution-
ary force. In other words, the working class makes use of objective mate-
rial conditions (here, suffering caused by contradictions in the capitalist 
system) to overcome suffering by way of a transformation in consciousness 
brought on by collective social action. As this recovering of humanity’s 
“species being” is necessarily collective, it might be reconceived as a 
breaking away from subjectivity towards an expanded sense of self, and 
with it an expanded sense of duty and responsibilities—that is, a new 
form of “selfless” humanism.15 Of course, the issue remains as to whether 
this form of liberation must emerge—as Marx and Engels insist—from a 
particular class of people, rather than anyone who experiences suffering. 
But even the difference here between Marx and Buddhism may be less 
great than appears, because Marx clearly saw that alienation and dehu-
                                                        
15 “The notion that Marx regarded socialism as a system for depressing individuals into 
a Comtean universal being deprived of all subjectivity is one of the absurdest aberra-
tions to which the study of his work has given rise. What can be said with truth is that 
in Marx’s view personality if not a mere matter of self-experience on the lines of the 
cogito ergo sum, because there is no such thing as pure self-knowledge apart from con-
sciousness of the social life in which the individual has his being” (Kołakowski 256).  
Shields, Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis 494  
 
 
manization were conditions faced by all people regardless of class or so-
cial status; it was simply that those facing the most severe forms of suf-
fering had less to lose by breaking their chains, and would be the ones 
ultimately responsible for the more general transformation of humanity 
into truly social beings. 
In a recent essay called “The Common in Communism,” Michael 
Hardt argues that, far from being an extreme version of state socialism, 
communism might be reconceived a “middle path” between private 
property and public property, as its focus is primarily on what is held—
or better, utilized—“in common.” Hardt goes on to lament the turn in 
some of Marx’s later writings —such as Capital—away from a nuanced, to 
my mind, potentially Dharmic, understanding of materialism, one that 
prioritizes the “appropriation of our own subjectivity, our human, social 
relations” (140). As Hardt notes, when Marx in his early work wrote of 
“appropriation,” he was using the term against the grain—almost ironi-
cally, because what is really meant is not the grasping onto what really 
exists, but rather “creating something new,” that is, nothing less than a 
new form of humanity, both individual and communal. Indeed, Marx was 
suspicious of the forms of materialism he saw around him, in which cog-
nition was conceived as a passive reception of the object, transforming it 
into a subjective content. Marx tended to describe his own view as natu-
ralism or humanism, which, he says, “differs equally from idealism and 
materialism, being the truth which unites them both.” As Kołakowski 
notes, this is, fundamentally, an anthropocentric viewpoint, 
. . . seeing in humanized nature a counterpart of practical 
human intentions; as human practice has a social charac-
ter, its cognitive effect—the image of nature—is the work of 
social man. Human consciousness is merely the expression 
in thought of a social relationship to nature, and must be 
considered as a product of the collective effort of the spe-
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cies. Accordingly, deformations of consciousness are not to 
be explained as due to the aberrations or imperfections of 
consciousness itself: their sources are to be looked for in 
more original processes, and particularly in the alienation 
of labour (113-14). 
Here we have a picture of a humanistic naturalism (or noological physical-
ism?) that locates meaning within collective praxis—premised upon, or 
constiutuent with, a radical transformation of consciousness via an 
awakening to its “deformations.” 
Might this correspond to a Buddhist conception of liberation? 
Most striking from the perspective of my argument here is Hardt’s con-
clusion that, contrary the common interpretation of the early Marx, and 
to some of the writer’s own admissions: 
Marx’s notion of communism in the early manuscripts is 
far from humanism, that is, far from any recourse to a pre-
existing or eternal human essence. Instead the positive 
content of communism, which corresponds to the abolition 
of private property, is the autonomous human production 
of subjectivity, the human production of humanity—a new 
seeing, a new hearing, a new thinking, a new loving. (141) 
Although this might sound—especially to the later Marx—as a in-
sufficiently complete liberation from the chains of Hegelian (or Platonis-
tic) idealism, it is crucial to note that this vision of a transfigured subjec-
tivity (and society), based in what Hardt calls “biopolitical production,” 
remains rooted in the basic assumptions of philosophical and historical 
(if not dialectical) materialism. Noteworthy here is Hardt’s notion that 
radical humanism—that is, grasping humanity by the roots—entails a 
recognition and acceptance of a lack of human nature; and one might 
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conclude, of the substantial self. Rather than see this as a capitulation to 
nihilistic passivity, however, it is the very ground of liberation itself. 
 
References 
Abū al-Fazl̤ ibn Mubarek. The Ain i Akbari, Volume 3, translated by H. S. 
Jarrett. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1893. 
Ambedkar, B. R. The Buddha and his Dhamma: A Critical Edition. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2011. 
Bacon, Francis. The Novum Organon: or, A True Guide to the Interpretation of 
Nature, translated by G.W. Kitchin. Toronto: University of Toronto Li-
braries, 2011. 
Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. 
Garden City: Anchor Books, 1966. 
Birnbaum, Max. “Beyond Marx in the Sociology of Religion.” In Beyond 
the Classics? Essays in the Scientific Study of Religion, edited by Charles Glock 
and Philip E. Hammond. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.  
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. What is Philosophy, translatd by Hugh 
Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994. 
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri C. Spivak. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978. 
Gramsci, Antonio. Opere di Antonio Gramsci, vol. 2. Turin: Einaudi. 
Harvey, Peter. An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, 
2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
497 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
 
 
 
Heera, Bhupender. Uniqueness of Cārvāka Philosophy in Traditional In-
dian Thought. New Delhi: Decent Books, 2011. 
Hershock, Peter. Valuing Diversity: Buddhist Reflection on Realizing a 
More Equitable Global Future. Albany: SUNY Press, 2012. 
Karunatilake, H. N. S. 1976. This Confused Society. Colombo: Buddhist In-
formation Centre. 
Kołakowski, Leszek. Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders, The Gold-
en Age, The Breakdown, 3 Volumes. New York: W. W. Norton, 2008. 
Lai, Whalen. “Seno’o Girō and the Dilemma of Modern Buddhism: Leftist 
Prophet of the Lotus Sutra,” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 11, nos. 2-
3 (1984), 7-42. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Tristes Tropiques, translated by John Russell. New 
York: Criterion Books, 1961. 
Lukács, György. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dia-
lectics. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972. 
Mani, Braj Ranjan. “Dr. Ambedkar’s Predecessors on the Path Towards 
Narayana.” In Buddhism and the Contemporary World: An Ambedkarian Per-
spective, edited by Bhalchandra Mungekar and Aakash Singh Rathore, 57-
85. New Delhi: Bookwell, 2007. 
Martin, Bill. Ethical Marxism. Chicago: Open Court Publications, 2008. 
Marx, Karl. Capital, Volume I: A Critique of Political Economy, translated by 
Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. Mineola: Dover Books. 
          . Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in Col-
lected Works, Volume 3, 175-87. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975. 
Shields, Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis 498  
 
 
          . “On the Jewish Question,” in Collected Works, Volume 3, 146-74. Mos-
cow: Progress Publishers, 1975. 
          . “Theses on Feuerbach,” in Collected Works, Volume 5, 3-5. Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1975. 
Nichiren. “Hakumai ippyō gosho.” In Complete Writings of Nichiren 
Daishōnin, 1596-97; English translation, “The Gift of Rice,” in The Writings 
of Nichiren Daishōnin, 1126. Online. Available HTTP: 
<www.sgilibrary.org/view.php?page=1126&m=1&q=gift%20of%20rice 
(accessed 21 May 2013). 
Payutto, P. A. Buddhist Economics: A Middle Way for the Marketplace 
(1992). Online. Available HTTP:  <www.buddhanet.net 
/cmdsg/econ.htm> (accessed 30 December 2010). 
Radhakrishnan. A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1967. 
Riepe, Dale. The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought. New Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1964. 
Rorty, Richard. “Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity.” In Essays on 
Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, 164-76. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Rorty, Richard. Non-reductive Physicalism. In Objectivity, Relativism, and 
Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991. 
Sankrityayan, Rahul. “Buddhist Dialectics.” In Buddhism: The Marxist Ap-
proach, 1-8. New Delhi: People’s Publishing, 1973. 
Santikaro Bhikku. “Buddhadasa Bhikku: Life and Society through the 
Natural Eyes of Voidness.” In Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Move-
499 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
 
 
 
ments in Asia, edited by Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King. Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1996. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Search for a Method, translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963. 
Schumacher, E. F. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. London: 
Blond and Briggs, 1973. 
Seno’o Girō. Seno’o Girō shūkyō ronshu, edited by Inagaki Masami. Tokyo: 
Daizō Shuppan, 1975. 
Shields, James Mark. Critical Buddhism: Engaging with Modern Japanese 
Buddhist Thought. London: Ashgate Press, 2011. 
          . “A Blueprint for Buddhist Revolution: The Radical Buddhism of 
Seno’o Girō (1889-1961) and the Youth League for Revitalizing Bud-
dhism.” Journal of Japanese Religious Studies 39, no. 2 (2012): 333-51. 
          . “Political Interpretations of the Lotus Sutra.” In A Companion to 
Buddhist Philosophy, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel, 512-23. London: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2013. 
          . “Seno’o Girō: Life and Thought of a Radical Buddhist.” In Under-
standing Buddhism through Biography, edited by Todd Lewis. London: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 
Surin, Kenneth. “Materialism + Philosophy.” In The Deleuze Dictionary, ed-
ited by Adrian Park, 160-62. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 
Timmerman, Peter. 1995. “Defending Materialism.” People and the Planet 
4, no. 1, 30-31. 
 
